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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                        --------
                Nos. 90-1341 and 90-1517
                        --------
           UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
                       PETITIONERS
90-1341                    v.
                       OHIO et al.

                OHIO, et al., PETITIONERS
90-1517                    v.
           UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
  on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
              appeals for the sixth circuit
                    [April 21, 1992]

  Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question in this case is whether Congress has waived
the National Government's sovereign immunity from lia-
bility for civil fines imposed by a State for past violations of
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33
U. S. C.  1251, et seq., or the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2796, as amended,
42 U. S. C. 6901 et seq.  We hold it has not done so in
either instance.
                            I
  The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters without a permit.  Section 402, codified at
33 U. S. C. 1342, gives primary authority to issue such
permits to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), but allows EPA to authorize a State to
supplant the federal permit program with one of its own, if
the state scheme would include, among other features, suffi-

ciently stringent regulatory standards and adequate
provisions for penalties to enforce them.  See generally 33
U. S. C. 1342(b) (requirements and procedures for EPA
approval of state water-pollution permit plans); see also 40
CFR 123.1-123.64 (1991) (detailed requirements for state
plans).  RCRA regulates the disposal of hazardous waste in
much the same way, with a permit program run by EPA
but subject to displacement by an adequate state counter-
part.  See generally 42 U. S. C. 6926 (requirements and
procedures for EPA approval of state hazardous-waste
disposal permit plans); see also 40 CFR 271.1-271.138
(1991) (detailed requirements for state plans).
  This case began in 1986 when respondent State of Ohio
sued petitioner Department of Energy (DOE) in Federal
District Court for violations of state and federal pollution
laws, including the CWA and RCRA, in operating its
uranium-processing plant in Fernald, Ohio.  Ohio sought,
among other forms of relief, both state and federal civil
penalties for past violations of the CWA and RCRA and of
state laws enacted to supplant those federal statutes.  See,
e.g., Complaint -64 (seeking penalties for violations of state
law and of regulations issued pursuant to RCRA); id., -115
(seeking penalties for violations of state law and of CWA).
Before the district court ruled on DOE's motion for dismiss-
al, the parties proposed a consent decree to settle all but
one substantive claim, and Ohio withdrew all outstanding
claims for relief except its request for civil penalties for
DOE's alleged past violations.  See Consent Decree Between
DOE and Ohio, App. 63.  By a contemporaneous stipulation,
DOE and Ohio agreed on the amount of civil penalties DOE
will owe if it is found liable for them, see Stipulation
Between DOE and Ohio, id., at 87.  The parties thus left for
determination under the motion to dismiss only the issue
we consider today:  whether Congress has waived the
National Government's sovereign immunity from liability
for civil fines imposed for past failure to comply with the
CWA, RCRA, or state law supplanting the federal regula-
tion.
  DOE admits that the CWA and RCRA obligate a federal
polluter, like any other, to obtain permits from EPA or the
state permitting agency, see Brief for Petitioner 24 (discuss-
ing CWA); id., at 34-40 (discussing RCRA).  DOE also
concedes that the CWA and RCRA render federal agencies
liable for fines imposed to induce them to comply with
injunctions or other judicial orders designed to modify
behavior prospectively, which we will speak of hereafter as
``coercive fines.''  See id., at 19-20, and n. 10; see also n. 14,
infra.  The parties disagree only on whether the CWA and
RCRA, in either their ``federal-facilities'' or ``citizen-suit''
sections, waive federal sovereign immunity from liability for
fines, which we will refer to as ``punitive,'' imposed to
punish past violations of those statutes or state laws
supplanting them.
  The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that both statutes waived federal
sovereign immunity from punitive fines, by both their
federal-facilities and citizen-suit sections.  689 F. Supp. 760
(1988).  A divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that
Congress had waived immunity from punitive fines in the
CWA's federal-facilities section and RCRA's citizen-suit
section, but not in RCRA's federal-facilities section.  904 F.
2d 1058 (1990).  Judge Guy dissented, concluding that
neither the CWA's federal-facilities section nor RCRA's
citizen-suit section sufficed to provide the waiver at issue.
Id., at 1065-1069.
  In No. 90-1341, DOE petitioned for review insofar as the
Sixth Circuit found any waiver of immunity from punitive
fines, while in No. 90-1517 Ohio cross-petitioned on the
holding that RCRA's federal-facilities section failed to effect
such a waiver.  We consolidated the two petitions and
granted certiorari, 500 U. S. ___ (1991).
                           II
  We start with a common rule, with which we presume
congressional familiarity, see McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Center, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1991), that any waiver of the
National Government's sovereign immunity must be
unequivocal, see United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535,
538-539 (1980).  ``Waivers of immunity must be `construed
strictly in favor of the sovereign,' McMahon v. United
States, 342 U. S. 25, 27 (1951), and not `enlarge[d] . . .
beyond what the language requires.'  Eastern Transporta-
tion Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927).''
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983).
By these lights we examine first the two statutes' citizen-
suit sections, which can be treated together because their
relevant provisions are similar, then the CWA's federal-
facilities section, and, finally, the corresponding section of
RCRA.
                            A

  So far as it concerns us, the CWA's citizen-suit section
reads that

  ``any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
  behalf -
  (1) against any person (including . . . the United States
. . .) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
a standard or limitation . . . .
         .        .        .       .        .
``The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce an
effluent standard or limitation, or such an order . . . as the
case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties
under [33 U. S. C. 1319(d)].''  33 U. S. C. 1365(a).

  The relevant part of the corresponding section of RCRA is
similar:

    ``any person may commence a civil action on his own
  behalf -
  ``(1)(A) against any person (including . . . the United
States) . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
order which has become effective pursuant to this chap-
ter . . .
  ``(B) against any person, including the United States . . .
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment . . . .
         .        .        .       .        .
  ``. . . The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to
enforce the permit, standard, regulation, condition, require-
ment, prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A),
to restrain any person who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person
to take such other action as may be necessary, or both, . . .
and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [42
U. S. C. 6928 (a) and (g)].''  42 U. S. C.  6972(a).

A State is a ``citizen'' under the CWA and a ``person'' under
RCRA, and is thus entitled to sue under these provisions.
  Ohio and its amici argue that by specifying the United
States as an entity subject to suit and incorporating the
civil-penalties sections of the CWA and RCRA into their
respective citizen-suit sections, ``Congress could not avoid
noticing that its literal language subject[ed] federal entities
to penalties.''  Brief for Respondent 36; see also, e.g., Brief
for National Governors' Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
14-16.  It is undisputed that each civil-penalties provision
authorizes fines of the punitive sort.
  The effect of incorporating each statute's civil-penalties
section into its respective citizen-suit section is not, howev-
er, as clear as Ohio claims.  The incorporations must be
read as encompassing all the terms of the penalty provi-
sions, including their limitations, see, e.g., Engel v. Daven-
port, 271 U. S. 33, 38 (1926) (adoption of earlier statute by
reference ``makes it as much a part of the later act as
though it had been incorporated at full length''); see also 2B
N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 51.08 (5th
ed. 1992), and significant limitations for present purposes
result from restricting the applicability of the civil-penalties
sections to ``persons.''  While both the CWA and RCRA
define ``person'' to cover States, subdivisions of States,
municipalities and interstate bodies (and RCRA even
extends the term to cover governmental corporations),
neither statute defines ``person'' to include the United
States.  Its omission has to be seen as a pointed one
when so many other governmental entities are specified, see
2A Singer, supra, 47.23, a fact that renders the civil-
penalties sections inapplicable to the United States.
  Against this reasoning, Ohio argues that the incorporated
penalty provisions' exclusion of the United States is
overridden by the National Government's express inclusion
as a ``person'' by each of the citizen-suit sections.  There is,
of course, a plausibility to the argument.  Whether that
plausibility suffices for the clarity required to waive
sovereign immunity is, nonetheless, an issue we need not
decide, for the force of Ohio's argument wanes when we
look beyond the citizen-suit sections to the full texts of the
respective statutes.
  What we find elsewhere in each statute are various
provisions specially defining ``person'' and doing so express-
ly for purposes of the entire section in which the term
occurs.  Thus, for example, ``[f]or the purpose of this [CWA]
section,'' 33 U. S. C. 1321(a)(7) defines ``person'' in such a
way as to exclude the various governmental entities
included in the general definition of ``person'' in 33
U. S. C.  1362(5).  Again, ``[f]or the purpose of this
section,'' 1322 (a)(8) defines ``person'' so as to exclude ``an
individual on board a public vessel'' as well as the govern-
mental entities falling within the general definition.
Similarly in RCRA, ``[f]or the purpose of . . . subchapter
[IX]'' the general definition of ``person'' is expanded to
include ``the United States Government,'' among other
entities.  42 U. S. C. 6991(6).  Within each statute, then,
there is a contrast between drafting that merely redefines
``person'' when it occurs within a particular clause or
sentence, and drafting that expressly alters the definition
for any and all purposes of the entire section in which the
special definition occurs.  Such differences in treatment
within a given statutory text are reasonably understood to
reflect differences in meaning intended, see 2A Singer,
supra, 46.06, and the inference can only be that a special
definition not described as being for purposes of the
``section'' or ``subchapter'' in which it occurs was intended to
have the more limited application to its own clause or
sentence alone.  Thus, in the instances before us here, the
inclusion of the United States as a ``person'' must go to the
clauses subjecting the United States to suit, but no further.
  This textual analysis passes the test of giving effect to all
the language of the citizen-suit sections.  Those sections'
incorporations of their respective statutes' civil-penalties
sections will have the effect of authorizing punitive fines
when a polluter other than the United States is brought to
court by a citizen, while the sections' explicit authorizations
for suits against the United States will likewise be effective,
since those sections concededly authorize coercive sanctions
against the National Government.
  A clear and unequivocal waiver of anything more cannot
be found; a broader waiver may not be inferred, see
Ruckelshaus, 463 U. S., at 685-686.  Ohio's reading is
therefore to be rejected.  See United States v. Nordic Village
Inc., 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 7).
                            B
  The relevant portion of the CWA's federal-facilities
section provides that

    ``[e]ach department, agency, or instrumentality of the
  . . . Federal Government . . . shall be subject to, and
  comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
  requirements, administrative authority, and process and
  sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water
  pollution in the same manner . . . as any nongovernmen-
  tal entity . . . .  The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to
  any requirement whether substantive or procedural
  (including any recordkeeping or reporting requirement,
  any requirement respecting permits and any other
  requirement, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any
  Federal, State or local administrative authority, and (C)
  to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal,
  State, or local courts or in any other manner. . . .  [T]he
  United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties
  arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local
  court to enforce an order or the process of such court.''  33
  U. S. C. 1323(a).
Ohio rests its argument for waiver as to punitive fines on
two propositions:  first, that the statute's use of the word
``sanction'' must be understood to encompass such fines, see
Brief for Respondent 26-29; and, second, with respect to the
fines authorized under a state permit program approved by
EPA, that they ``aris[e] under Federal law'' despite their
genesis in state statutes, and are thus within the scope of
the ``civil penalties'' covered by the congressional waiver.
Id., at 29-35.
                            1
  Ohio's first proposition is mistaken.  As a general matter,
the meaning of ``sanction'' is spacious enough to cover not
only what we have called punitive fines, but coercive ones
as well, and use of the term carries no necessary implica-
tion that a reference to punitive fines is intended.  One of
the two dictionaries Ohio itself cites reflects this breadth,
see Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
``sanction'' as a ``[p]enalty or other mechanism of enforce-
ment used to provide incentives for obedience with the law
or with rules and regulations.  That part of a law which is
designed to secure enforcement by imposing a penalty for
its violation or offering a reward for its observance'').
Ohio's other such source explicitly adopts the coercive sense
of the term, see Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1137 (3d ed.
1969) (defining sanction in part as ``[a] coercive measure'').

  Beyond the dictionaries, examples of usage in the coercive
sense abound.  See, e.g., Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.
S. 585, 590 (1947) (fines and imprisonment imposed as
``coercive sanctions'' when imposed to compel target ``to do
what the law made it his duty to do''); Hicks v. Feiock, 485
U. S. 624, 633-634 n. 6 (1988) (``sanction'' in Penfield was
civil because it was conditional; contemnor could avoid
``sanction'' by agreeing to comply with discovery order); Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b) (describing as ``sanctions'' various
steps district court may take in response to noncompliance
with discovery orders, including holding recalcitrant
deponent in contempt); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 648 F. 2d 642, 649 (CA9 1981) (discussing ``sanc-
tions,'' imposed pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b),
consisting of fine for each day litigant remained in non-
compliance with District Court's discovery order); Latrobe
Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 1537, 545
F. 2d 1336, 1344 (CA3 1976) (``Coercive sanctions . . . look
to the future and are designed to aid the plaintiff by
bringing a defiant party into compliance with the court
order or by assuring that a potentially contumacious party
adheres to an injunction by setting forth in advance the
penalties the court will impose if the party deviates from
the path of obedience''); Vincent v. Preiser, 175 W.Va. 797,
803, 338 S.E. 2d 398, 403 (1985) (discussing contempt
``sanctions'' imposed ``to compel compliance with a court
order''); Maltaman v. State Bar of Cal., 43 Cal. 3d 924, 936,
741 P. 2d 185, 189-190 (1987) (describing as ``sanctions''
daily fine imposed on party until it complied with order
directing it to transfer certain property); Labor Relations
Comm'n v. Fall River Educators' Assn., 382 Mass. 465,
475-476, 416 N.E. 2d 1340, 1347 (1981) (affirming propriety
of imposition of ``coercive contempt sanction''); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code Ann. 2023(b)(4) (West Supp. 1992) (authoriz-
ing, in response to litigant's failure to obey discovery order,
``terminating sanction[s],'' including ``contempt sanction[s]''
and orders staying further proceedings by recalcitrant
litigant).  Cf. 42 U. S. C. 6992e(a) (waiving federal
medical-waste disposal facilities' sovereign immunity from
various requirements, including such ``sanctions as may be
imposed by a court to enforce [injunctive] relief''); id., 6961
(using same language to waive other federal facilities'
immunity from RCRA provisions).  Thus, resort to a
``sanction'' carries no necessary implication of the punitive
as against the coercive.
  The term's context, of course, may supply a clarity that
the term lacks in isolation, see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa
Dept. of Revenue, 488 U. S. 19, 26 (1988).  It tends to do so
here, but once again the clarity so found cuts against Ohio's
position.  The word ``sanction'' appears twice in 1323(a),
each time within the phrase ``process and sanction[s].''  The
first sentence subjects government agencies to ``process and
sanctions,'' while the second explains that the government's
corresponding liability extends to ``any process and sanction,
whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any
other manner.''
  Three features of this context are significant.  The first is
the separate statutory recognition of three manifestations
of governmental power to which the United States is
subjected: substantive and procedural requirements;
administrative authority; and ``process and sanctions,''
whether ``enforced'' in courts or otherwise.  Substantive
requirements are thus distinguished from judicial process,
even though each might require the same conduct, as when
a statute requires and a court orders a polluter to refrain
from discharging without a permit.  The second noteworthy
feature is the conjunction of ``sanction[s]'' not with the
substantive ``requirements,'' but with ``process,'' in each of
the two instances in which ``sanction'' appears.  ``Process''
normally refers to the procedure and mechanics of adjudica-
tion and the enforcement of decrees or orders that the
adjudicatory process finally provides.  The third feature to
note is the statute's reference to ``process and sanctions'' as
``enforced'' in courts or otherwise.  Whereas we commonly
understand that ``requirements'' may be enforced either by
backward-looking penalties for past violations or by the
``process'' of forward-looking orders enjoining future viola-
tions, such forward-looking orders themselves are character-
istically given teeth by equity's traditional coercive sanc-
tions for contempt: fines and bodily commitment imposed
pending compliance or agreement to comply.  The very fact,
then, that the text speaks of sanctions in the context of
enforcing "process" as distinct from substantive "require-
ments" is a good reason to infer that Congress was using
``sanction'' in its coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive
fines.
                            2
  The last relevant passage of 1323(a), which provides
that ``the United States shall be liable only for those civil
penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State
or local court to enforce an order or the process of such
court,'' is not to the contrary.  While this proviso is unlike
the preceding text in that it speaks of ``civil penalties,'' not
``sanctions,'' it is obviously phrased to clarify or limit the
waiver preceding it.  Here our concern is with its clarifying
function (leaving its limiting effect until later), and it must
be said that as a clarifier the proviso speaks with an
uncertain voice.  To be sure, the second modifier of ``civil
penalties'' at least makes it plain that the term (like
``sanction,'' to which it relates) must include a coercive
penalty, since such penalties are exemplified by those
``imposed by a state or local court to enforce an order or the
process of such court.''  To this extent, then, the proviso
serves to confirm the reading we reached above.
  The role of the first modifier is problematical, however.
On the one hand, it tugs toward a more expansive reading
of ``civil penalties.''  If by using the phrase ``civil penalties
arising under federal law'' Congress meant nothing more
than coercive fines arising under federal law, it would have
been simpler to describe all such penalties as imposed to
enforce an order or process, whether of a local, state, or
federal court.  Thus, the first modifier suggests that the
civil penalties arising under federal law may indeed include
the punitive along with the coercive.  Nevertheless, a
reading expansive enough to reflect a waiver as to punitive
fines would raise a new and troublesome question about the
source of legal authority to impose such a fine.  As far as
federal law is concerned, the only available source of
authority to impose punitive fines is the civil-penalties
section, 1319(d).  But, as we have already seen, that
section does not authorize liability against the United
States, since it applies only against ``persons,'' from whom
the United States is excluded.
  Ohio urges us to find a source of authority good against
the United States by reading ``arising under federal law'' to
include penalties prescribed by state statutes approved by
EPA and supplanting the CWA.  Ohio argues for treating a
state statute as providing penalties ``arising under federal
law'' by stressing the complementary relationship between
the relevant state and federal statutes and the role of such
state statutes in accomplishing the purpose of the CWA.
This purpose, as Ohio states it, is ``to encourage compliance
with comprehensive, federally approved water pollution
programs while shielding federal agencies from unautho-
rized penalties.''  Brief for Respondent 34-35.  Ohio asserts
that ``federal facility compliance . . . cannot be . . . accom-
plished without the [punitive] penalty deterrent.''  Id., at
35.
  The case for such pessimism is not, however, self-evident.
To be sure, an agency of the Government may break the
law where it might have complied voluntarily if it had faced
the prospect of punitive fines for past violations.  But to say
that its ``compliance cannot be . . . accomplished'' without
such fines is to assume that without sanctions for past
conduct a federal polluter can never be brought into future
compliance, that an agency of the National Government
would defy an injunction backed by coercive fines and even
a threat of personal commitment.  The position seems also
to ignore the fact that once such fines start running they
can be every dollar as onerous as their punitive counter-
parts; it could be a very expensive mistake to plan on
ignoring the law indefinitely on the assumption that
contumacy would be cheap.
  Nor does the complementary relationship between state
and federal law support Ohio's claim that state-law fines
thereby ``arise under federal law.''  Plain language aside,
the far more compelling interpretative case rests on the
best-known statutory use of the phrase ``arising under
federal law,'' appearing in the grant of federal-question
jurisdiction to the courts of the United States.  See 28
U. S. C. 1331.  There, we have read the phrase ``arising
under'' federal law to exclude cases in which the plaintiff
relies on state law, even when the State's exercise of power
in the particular circumstances is expressly permitted by
federal law.  See, e.g., Gully v. First National Bank in
Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 116 (1936) (suit over state taxation
of nationally chartered bank does not arise under federal
law even though such taxation would not be possible
without federal approval); International Bridge Co. v. New
York, 254 U. S. 126, 133 (1920) (congressional approval of
construction of bridge by state-chartered company does not
make federal law the source of right to build bridge).
Congress' use of the same language in 1323(a) indicates a
likely adoption of our prior interpretation of that language.
See, e.g., ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270,
284-285 (1987) (interpreting statute based on previous
interpretation of same language in another statute);
Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Education, 412 U. S. 427, 428
(1973) (per curiam) (similarity of language in two statutes
``strong indication that [they] should be interpreted pari
passu'').  The probability is enough to answer Ohio's
argument that ``arising under Federal law'' in 1323(a) is
broad enough to cover provisions of state statutes approved
by a federal agency but nevertheless applicable ex proprio
vigore.
  Since Ohio's argument for treating state-penalty provi-
sions as arising under federal law thus fails, our reading of
the last quoted sentence from 1323(a) leaves us with an
unanswered question and an unresolved tension between
closely related statutory provisions.  The question is still
what Congress could have meant in using a seemingly
expansive phrase like ``civil penalties arising under federal
law.''  Perhaps it used it just in case some later amendment
might waive the government's immunity from punitive
sanctions.  Perhaps a drafter mistakenly thought that
liability for such sanctions had somehow been waived
already.  Perhaps someone was careless.  The question has
no satisfactory answer.
  We do, however, have a response satisfactory for sover-
eign immunity purposes to the tension between a proviso
suggesting an apparently expansive but uncertain waiver
and its antecedent text that evinces a narrower waiver with
greater clarity.  For under our rules that tension is resolved
by the requirement that any statement of waiver be
unequivocal:  as against the clear waiver for coercive fines
the indication of a waiver as to those that are punitive is
less certain.  The rule of narrow construction therefore
takes the waiver no further than the coercive variety.




                            C
  We consider, finally, the federal-facilities section of
RCRA, which provides, in relevant part, that the National
Government
    ``shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State,
  interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and
  procedural (including any requirement for permits or
  reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such
  sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such
  relief) . . . in the same manner, and to the same extent,
  as any person is subject to such requirements . . . .
  Neither the United States, nor any agent, employee, or
  officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any pro-
  cess or sanction of any State or Federal Court with
  respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief.''
  42 U. S. C. 6961.

Ohio and its amici stress the statutory subjection of federal
facilities to ``all . . . requirements,'' which they would have
us read as an explicit and unambiguous waiver of federal
sovereign immunity from punitive fines.  We, however,
agree with the Tenth Circuit that ``all . . . requirements''
``can reasonably be interpreted as including substantive
standards and the means for implementing those standards,
but excluding punitive measures.''  Mitzelfelt v. Department
of Air Force, 903 F. 2d 1293, 1295 (CA10 1990).
  We have already observed that substantive requirements
can be enforced either punitively or coercively, and the
Tenth Circuit's understanding that Congress intended the
latter finds strong support in the textual indications of the
kinds of requirements meant to bind the Government.
Significantly, all of them refer either to mechanisms
requiring review for substantive compliance (permit and
reporting requirements) or to mechanisms for enforcing
substantive compliance in the future (injunctive relief and
sanctions to enforce it).  In stark contrast, the statute
makes no mention of any mechanism for penalizing past
violations, and this absence of any example of punitive fines
is powerful evidence that Congress had no intent to subject
the United States to an enforcement mechanism that could
deplete the federal fisc regardless of a responsible officer's
willingness and capacity to comply in the future.
  The drafters' silence on the subject of punitive sanctions
becomes virtually audible after one reads the provision's
final sentence, waiving immunity ``from any process or
sanction of any State or Federal Court with respect to the
enforcement of any such injunctive relief.''  The fact that
the drafter's only specific reference to an enforcement
mechanism described ``sanction'' as a coercive means of
injunctive enforcement bars any inference that a waiver of
immunity from ``requirements'' somehow unquestionably
extends to punitive fines that are never so much as men-
tioned.
                           III
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.